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We employ information-gap decision theory to derive a robust monetary policy response
to Knightian parameter uncertainty. This approach provides a quantitative answer to
the question: For a speciﬁed policy, how much can our models and data err or vary,
without rendering the outcome of that policy unacceptable to a policymaker? For a given
acceptable level of performance, the policymaker selects the policy that delivers acceptable
performance under the greatest range of uncertainty. We show that such information-gap
robustness is a proxy for probability of policy success. Hence, policies that are likely to
succeed can be identiﬁed without knowing the probability distribution. We adopt this
approach to investigate empirically the robust monetary policy response to a supply shock
with an uncertain degree of persistence.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we employ ’information-gap decision theory’ to derive robust monetary policy
in the face of Knightian parameter uncertainty. An information-gap, hereafter info-gap, is
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1a disparity between what is known, and what must be known, in order to make a reliable
decision. An info-gap reﬂects a decision maker’s ignorance about some aspect which cannot be
modeled probabilistically. Thus, an info-gap is said to represent Knightian uncertainty about
that aspect.
Info-gap decision theory deals with making robust decisions under Knigtian uncertainty;
see Ben-Haim (2006a). It suggests choosing a robust-satisﬁcing policy in contrast with those
implied by the two common approaches to decision making under uncertainty: the Bayesian
approach and the robust decision theory; see e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen et al
(2006) and Adam (2004). Within the info-gap approach, robustness to (speciﬁed) uncertainty
is only available at the cost of sacriﬁcing some performance relative to what is attainable
through optimal monetary policy under no uncertainty. The more performance one is willing
to sacriﬁce, the more robustness can be obtained.
Robustness of a policy may be equated with the range of possible realizations of the un-
certain parameter within which acceptable or satisfactory outcomes are guaranteed by that
policy. The larger the range, the higher the robustness (at a speciﬁed level of aspiration).
Thus, the most robust policy would be the policy that delivers an acceptable outcome under
the largest range of possible parameter values. Moreover, the lower the aspirations, i.e. the
lower the required level of performance, the larger the range of parameter values under which
the most robust policy will perform satisfactorily, i.e. not worse than the required level.
The main output from an info-gap-based analysis is a set of robustness functions associated
with policies considered. A robustness function speciﬁes how much robustness a given policy
will deliver at diﬀerent levels of required or acceptable performances. Accordingly, some policies
may be more robust than others for all levels of acceptable performances, or they may be more
robust than others up to some level of acceptable performance, while the converse may be the
case afterwards.
The robust-satisﬁcing policy would maximize robustness at a given level of acceptable
performance. One may also say that the robust-satisﬁcing policy would require a minimum of
reduction in aspirations relative to the other policies considered to deliver a given robustness
level.
We show that info-gap robustness may be considered a proxy for the probability of a
policy’s success. That is, any change in a policy which augments the robustness also augments
the probability of a policy’s success. Intuitively, an increase in the robustness of a policy can
be equated with an increase in the number of parameter values under which the policy will
2perform satisfactorily. Thus, if a policy becomes more robust, its success will tend to increase
if the additional parameter value under which it would perform satisfactorily has a positive
probability. Thus, even though the probability of a policy’s success cannot be calculated under
Knightian (parameter) uncertainty, the info-gap approach still enables us to rank policies
consistent with their success probabilities and helps identify the policy with maximal success-
probability.
In this paper, we employ the info-gap approach to derive robust-satisﬁcing monetary policy
in the face of a supply shock with an unknown degree of persistence. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that uncertainty is conﬁned to a single parameter, which determines the persistence in the
shock to inﬂation in our model. The persistence parameter is assumed to vary in the range of
[0,1) with unknown probability distribution. In order to identify the robust-satisﬁcing policy
among a set of policies in the face of the supply shock, we consider a set of monetary policy
rules and derive robustness functions associated with each of them.
We proceed in three steps to derive the robust-satisﬁcing policy. First, we derive values of
the monetary policy objective function for all policies of interest under possible outcomes of the
uncertain parameter in its prespeciﬁed space. Second, we evaluate how well each of the policies
considered will perform under every possible outcome of the uncertain parameter. And third,
we rank the policies in accordance with the number of possible parameter values, or the range
of possible parameter values, under which they will perform not worse than various tolerable
levels. The robust-satisﬁcing policy would be the one that would deliver an acceptable outcome
under the largest range of possible parameter values, i.e. has the highest degree of robustness.
The info-gap approach to deriving robust monetary policy under Knightian uncertainty
has recently been discussed by Ben-Haim (2005b). The info-gap approach has, however, been
previously applied to a wide variety of decision problems with Knightian uncertainty, includ-
ing ﬁnancial risk assessment (Ben-Haim 2005a), search behavior in animal foraging (Carmel
and Ben-Haim 2005), policy decisions in marine reserve design (Halpern et al 2006), natural
resource conservation decisions (Moilanen and Wintle 2006), inspection decisions by port au-
thorities to detect terrorist weapons (Moﬃtt et al 2005a) and to detect invasive species (Moﬃtt
et al 2005b), technological fault diagnosis (Pierce et al 2006) and engineering model-testing
(Vinot et al 2005).
Studies of monetary policy decisions under uncertainty are mainly based on the Bayesian
approach and the robust or maxmin decision theory; see e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2001),
Onatski and Williams (2003), Levin and Williams (2003a), Levin et al (2003b), Leitemo and
3S¨ oderstr¨ om (2005), Rustem et al (2005) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2004). The Bayesian
approach requires that one assigns a probability distribution on the uncertain aspect, e.g.
model parameters. This enables one to choose an expected-loss-minimising policy. Under
Knightian uncertainty, i.e. when uncertainty cannot be quantiﬁed in terms of (subjective)
probabilities, one can proceed by assigning an equal probability to a set of possible outcomes.
In such cases, the robust decision theory suggests policies that are designed to perform well in
worst-case scenarios. Accordingly, a ﬁctious malevolent agent who represents a policy maker’s
worst fears concerning misspeciﬁcation is introduced into the optimisation problem and moti-
vates her to minimize the loss function under the worst-case scenario.1
However, in contrast with the robust decision theory, the info-gap decision theory does not
imply ameliorating the most extreme case, which the policy maker deems possible in practice.
Instead, the info-gap approach guarantees a performance not worse than some required level
under outcomes of the uncertain factor(s) within the largest possible range or space. In other
words, our robust-satisﬁcing strategy implied by the info-gap decision theory seeks a policy
with adequate outcome for the largest range of unknown realizations.
Moreover, our robust-satisﬁcing strategy does not require one to specify the worst case,
which may be unknown. Actually, even when the worst case is known, ameliorating it is not
necessarily the most robust response to Knightian uncertainty. For example, in our empirical
analysis, the most robust policy corresponds to a scenario which is very diﬀerent from the
most extreme scenario. Another diﬀerence between the policy that ameliorates the worst case
and the one that maximizes info-gap robustness may be probability of success. The info-gap
strategy will maximize the probability of policy success, while a strategy that ameliorates
the worst case may have low robustness and hence low probability of success. The satisﬁcer
relinquishes some aspiration and gains conﬁdence - probability of success - in return.
In contrast with the Bayesian approach, the info-gap approach does not imply minimization
of an expected loss function deﬁned by a chosen set of probabilities over, say, possible para-
meter values. There is, however, one similarity with the Bayesian approach under a uniform
probability distribution over possible parameter values. That is, initially one treats equally
all possible parameter values within a prespeciﬁed range. But, instead of minimising expected
loss (by assigning equal probability to all of the possible outcomes), one derives values of the
1Knightian uncertainty can be either structured or non-structured (Tetlow and von zur Muehlen 2004).
Under structured Knightian uncertainty, the true values of one or more speciﬁed parameters of the model are
supposed to be bounded between known extreme values. Under unstructured Knightian uncertainty, however,
few restrictions are placed on the uncertain aspects of a model. The case considered in this paper may therefore
be classiﬁed as structured Knightian uncertainty.
4objective function for all feasible policies conditional, in turn, on every value of the uncertain
parameter in its prespeciﬁed range.
We employ a well documented macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy to
undertake the empirical analysis within the info-gap framework; see B˚ ardsen et al (2001) and
Akram et al (2006) for model documentation. In order to ease the derivation of monetary policy
rules in the light of the supply shock with some degree of persistence, and for expositional
purposes, we follow the approach proposed in Akram (2006). Accordingly, a shock-speciﬁc
linear interest rate rule is speciﬁed. This rule depends on a single decision variable: the policy
horizon. A policy horizon is deﬁned as the duration of the period in which the policy interest
rate deviates from its reference value in response to a shock. The policy horizon is closely
linked with the target horizon, which indicates when the inﬂation rate will be close to its
target rate. Thus, one may distinguish between diﬀerent (shock-speciﬁc) interest rate rules by
diﬀerent policy horizons, alternatively by diﬀerent target horizons. Accordingly, the number
of policies to be evaluated would be equal to the number of policy horizons of interest.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section oﬀers a brief overview of the info-gap
decision theory and reviews its main concepts. Section 3 formulates the decision problem within
the context of the problem at hand, and shows that the degree of robustness can be considered
a proxy variable for probability of policy success. The details of the proof are presented in
Appendix 2, while Appendix 1 presents some regularity conditions that a loss function must
satisfy to enable a precise formulation of the decision problem. Section 4 presents the loss
function of the policy maker and the optimal monetary policy rule in the absence of parameter
uncertainty. Section 5 characterizes the parameter uncertainty. Section 6 presents the empirical
analysis. Section 7 contains the main conclusions.
2 Info-gap decision theory: Managing uncertainty
Info-gaps are non-probabilistic and cannot be insured against or modeled probabilistically.
Hence, they are equated with Knigtian uncertainty. Examples of common info-gaps include
uncertainty regarding the shape of a probability distribution, the functional form of a relation-
ship between entities, or the values of some key parameters.
Info-gaps are quantiﬁed by info-gap models of uncertainty. An info-gap model is an un-
bounded family of nested sets that share a common structure. A frequently encountered
example is a family of nested ellipsoids that have the same shape. The structure of the sets in
5an info-gap model depends on information about the uncertainty. In general terms, the struc-
ture of an info-gap model of uncertainty is chosen to deﬁne the smallest or strictest family of
sets whose elements are consistent with the prior information.
A common example of an info-gap model is the fractional error model, which can be char-
acterized as follows:
V(α, e v) = {v(x) : |v(x) − e v(x)| ≤ αe v(x)}, α ≥ 0. (1)
Here, e v(x) denotes the best estimate of an uncertain function v(x), while the fractional error
from this estimate, α, is unknown. At any level of uncertainty α, the set V(α, e v) contains all
functions v(x) whose fractional deviation from e v(x) is no greater than α. However, the level of
uncertainty (α) is unknown, so the info-gap model is an unbounded family of sets, and there
is no worst case or greatest deviation. Many other types of info-gap models are discussed in
Ben-Haim (2006a).
All info-gap models obey two axioms: the axioms of nesting and contraction.
Nesting. The info-gap model V(α, e v) is nested if:
α < α0 implies V(α, e v) ⊂ V(α0, e v). (2)
Contraction. The info-gap model V(0, e v) is a singleton set containing its center point:
V(0, e v) = {e v}. (3)
The nesting axiom imposes the property of ‘clustering’, which is characteristic of info-gap
uncertainty. Furthermore, the nesting axiom implies that the uncertainty sets V(α, e v) become
more inclusive as α grows, thus endowing α with its meaning as a level of uncertainty. The
contraction axiom implies that at zero level of uncertainty the estimate e v is true.
Uncertain variations may be either adverse or favorable. Adversity entails the possibility
of failure. A robustness function expresses the greatest level of uncertainty at which failure
cannot occur.2
More precisely, the robustness function can be expressed as the maximum value of the
2The case of favorable uncertainty is discussed in Ben-Haim (2006a).
6uncertainty parameter α of an info-gap model:
b α(q) = max{α : minimal requirements are always satisﬁed}. (4)
Here, q denotes a vector of decision variables such as time of initiation, choice of a model or its
parameters, or operational options. Equation (4) expresses that robustness of q, b α(q), is the
greatest level of uncertainty α, or the greatest possible variation, for which speciﬁed minimal
requirements are always satisﬁed. b α(q) expresses robustness — the degree of immunity against
errors or deviations from ones’ assumptions — so a large value of b α(q) is desirable.
The robustness function involves maximization of the uncertainty, or the range of variation
in e.g. a variable, parameter or model, at which decision q would satisﬁce the performance at
a tolerable level. This amounts to choosing actions or policies aimed at maximising robustness
while satisﬁcing performance. The robustness function speciﬁes the trade-oﬀs associated with
a policy that one faces in a given situation.
More speciﬁcally, consider a scalar objective function or loss function L(q,v), which depends
on the decision vector q and the info-gap-uncertain function v. The minimal requirement in
eq.(4) could be that the loss L(q,v) be no greater than an acceptable level La. Usually La is
not chosen irrevocably before performing the decision analysis. Rather, La enables the decision
maker to explore a range of options (i.e. q-vectors).
The robustness function of eq.(4) can now be expressed more explicitly:











b α(q,La) is the greatest level of uncertainty or variation consistent with loss no greater than
the tolerable loss La. This deﬁnition can be modiﬁed to handle multi-criterion loss functions.
The robustness function generates robust-satisﬁcing preferences on the options. A decision
maker will usually prefer q over q0 if the robustness of q is greater than the robustness of q0 at
the same level of required performance La. That is:
q r q0 if b α(q,La) > b α(q0,La). (6)
A robust-satisﬁcing decision is one which maximizes the robustness on a set Q of available
7q-vectors and satisﬁces the performance at the acceptable level La:
b qc(La) = argmax
q∈Q
b α(q,La). (7)
Usually, though not invariably, the robust-satisﬁcing action b qc(La) depends on La.
A robustness function has the following key property. Robustness trades oﬀ against aspi-
ration for outcome: robustness deteriorates as the decision maker’s aspirations increase. In
particular, robustness is zero when aspirations are at maximum. Accordingly, an optimizing
decision conditional on speciﬁc values of relevant variables or parameters have zero robustness
to alternative parameter values. Robustness curves of alternative decisions may cross, imply-
ing reversal of preference depending on aspiration. Moreover, in some cases, the probability
of success is enhanced by enhancing the info-gap robustness, without knowing the underly-
ing probability distribution. Thus, robustness is a proxy for probability of success. We will
illustrate all of these properties in our analysis.
3 Robustness function under parameter uncertainty
In the following, we ﬁrst adapt the relatively general robustness function eq.(4) to our case of
Knightian parameter uncertainty. Thereafter, we present a theorem that relates our measure
of robustness to the probability of policy success.
The uncertain parameter in our case is the degree of persistence in a supply shock denoted
as φ. Sections 4 and 5 present our loss function, the value of which depends on φ, and the
decision variable, H, which represents the policy horizon. We aim to control the relative loss
denoted by dL(H;φ) and deﬁned in Section 5.
3.1 Robustness function
Assume that we wish to satisﬁce the loss function dL(H,φ) at the value dLa by deciding on
an appropriate policy horizon, H, as we do in Section 5. That is, we require:
dL(H,φ) ≤ dLa. (8)
dLa may be considered an exogenous value or a value which the policy maker chooses in the
light of the associated robustness function. The value of persistence, φ, is unknown. The
uncertainty in φ, α, may be represented by an info-gap model Φ(α,H), which is speciﬁed in
8Appendix 1.
The robustness of policy H, b α(H,dLa), is the greatest level of uncertainty α up to which
all realizations of the persistence result in acceptable loss to the decision maker:3











More robustness is better than less robustness, so we prefer policy H over H0 if H has a
higher robustness than H0, at the same value of dLa:
H r H0 if b α(H,dLa) > b α(H0,dLa). (10)
That is, the robustness function b α(H,dLa) engenders a preference ranking on the policy op-
tions, H. However, this ranking need not be unique, since it depends on the policy goal
expressed by the greatest acceptable loss, dLa. Accordingly, the preferred policy induced by
b α(H,dLa) may change as the greatest tolerable loss, dLa, changes.
The robust-satisﬁcing policy, for acceptable loss dLa, b H(dLa), is the policy which maximizes
the uncertainty or range of variation in the persistence of the shock:
b H(dLa) = argmax
H
b α(H,dLa). (11)
The robust-satisﬁcing policy may diﬀer from the full-knowledge optimal policy, which is deﬁned
in eq.(17).4
3.2 Robustness and probability of policy success
The robust-satisﬁcing preference on the policy options, eq.(10), seems reasonable: a policy
which is more immune to our ignorance of the persistence is desirable over a policy which is
less immune. We can also relate the robustness of a policy to its probability of success. In the
following, we show that robustness, which can be assessed, is a reliable proxy for the probability
of success, which cannot be assessed without knowledge of the probability distribution of φ.
The policy, H, is successful if it entails a loss that is less than dLa for the realized value
of the persistence, φ, which is not known when the policy is chosen. Let P(φ) denote the
3Other examples of info-gap robustness functions for monetary policy can be found in Ben-Haim (2005b and
2006a, pp.75–78).
4In this paper we will not explore info-gap uncertainty in probability distributions. However, the robust-
satisﬁcing strategy may also diﬀer from policies based on best-estimated probability distributions; for examples
see Ben-Haim (2005a, 2006a).
9unknown cumulative probability distribution for the persistence, with density function p(φ).
Formally, the probability of success for policy H would be:
Ps(H,dLa) = P[φ : dL(H,φ) ≤ dLa]. (12)
We can now state the following theorem, which is proven in Appendix 2 and is related to
other results in Ben-Haim (2006a, pp.279–284; 2006b). The proof depends on two concepts -
coherence and weak convexity - which are deﬁned in Appendix 2 building on Appendix 1.
Theorem 1 The probability of a policy’s success increases with its robustness.
Given:
• The info-gap model, Φ(α,H) in eq.(26), is coherent with the probability distribution P(φ).










Theorem 1 asserts that any inﬁnitesimal change in policy, H, which augments the info-gap
robustness, b α(H,dLa), also augments the probability of its success, Ps(H,dLa). The robustness
function is calculated without knowledge of the probability distribution, so robustness may be
considered a proxy for the probability of success. The theorem depends on the property of
coherence, which imposes a weak constraint on the class of probability distributions. One can
think of the coherence assumption as imposing an informational requirement on the info-gap
model, which must reveal something about the probability distribution; see Appendix 2 for a
precise deﬁnition of coherence.
4 Monetary policy: Objectives and instruments
In this section, we formulate the objective of monetary policy in the absence of Knightian
parameter uncertainty.
To devise optimal response to an observable shock that occurs at time τ, the central
bank minimizes the following loss function with respect to an interest rate path iτ, iτ+1,
iτ+2,..iτ+H−1, iτ+H, iτ+H+1,...:
L(.) = Vτ(Π) + λVτ(Y ), (14)
10subject to a constraint that the inﬂation rate must become close to its target in the short or
medium run rather than in the unspeciﬁed long run.5 H represents the policy horizon, i.e.
the number of periods during which interest rates will deviate from their reference value and
stimulate or restrain the economy. The target horizon, i.e. the number of periods inﬂation will
deviate from its target, will generally be linked and be close to the policy horizon.
Vτ(·) is a variance function conditional on information at time τ. λ indicates the degree
of concern for real economic stability around a trend, Y relative to that of Π, which denotes
deviation from the inﬂation target. The loss function admits a trade-oﬀ between the conditional
variance of inﬂation and that of the output-gap.
The constraint regarding the time frame for achieving the inﬂation target can be embedded
in an interest rate rule; see Akram (2006) for details. If the model is linear and interest rates are
allowed to return gradually towards their reference value (i0) upon a deviation, the following
interest rate rule can serve this purpose:
it = i0 + (1 − %H)
βε
(1 − φ)
ετ + %H(it−1 − i0) ; t = τ, τ + 1, τ + 2,.... (15)
The response coeﬃcient (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ) ≡ βε, H determines how much the interest rate
must change initially to counteract the inﬂationary eﬀects of a shock ετ. This initial deviation is
thereafter eliminated gradually, depending on the value of an interest rate smoothing parameter
%H. It appears that both the response coeﬃcient and the degree of smoothing depend on the
policy horizon.67
The value of βε/(1 − φ) depends on the shock and the model, and in this section is con-
sidered given. (We consider Knightian uncertainty in the next section.) Here, φ denotes the
degree of persistence in the shock and is assumed to be positive and less than one. βε is a
derived parameter whose value increases with the pass-through of the inﬂationary eﬀects of
5This perspective, where achieving the inﬂation target can be considered the primary objective while ob-
taining a stable inﬂation rate and output can be considered secondary objectives, is consistent with what Faust
and Henderson (2004) regard as best-practice monetary policy. Accordingly, “...best-practice policy can be
summarized in terms of two goals: First get mean inﬂation right; second, get the variance of inﬂation right.”,
but “...getting the mean right may be the goal of greatest importance”; see Faust and Henderson (2004, pp.
117–118).
6This rule resembles a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing except that it is the determinant of
inﬂation, i.e. ετ, that enters the rule rather than inﬂation itself; see Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
7Alternatively, one could characterize monetary policy by a Taylor-type simple interest rate rule. Then, a
speciﬁc policy would be deﬁned by one possible combination of the response coeﬃcients. Thus, a high number
of policies would be possible, depending on the number of response coeﬃcients, and had to be evaluated. In
addition, the relationship between the uncertain parameter and the response coeﬃcients would not be explicit.
Another alternative could be to derive optimal interest rate rules, as in e.g. Estrella and Mishkin (1999). Such
rules may be more suitable in the case of (theory-based) structural models. However, analytical expressions for
such rules may be hard to derive in the case of econometric reduced-form models of some size.
11the shock, but declines with the eﬀectiveness of interest rates in checking inﬂation. It can be
considered a constant (shock and model speciﬁc) parameter, if the transmission mechanism
is super exogenous with respect to the policy changes considered; see Engle et al (1983). It
follows that a persistent shock requires a stronger initial response than a transitory shock for
a given degree of interest rate smoothing (%H).
The policy horizon enters the interest rate rule through the interest rate smoothing para-
meter. %H is deﬁned as δ1/(H+1) and takes on a value in the range of (0, 1) depending on
the policy horizon H (for a given δ). δ is a suﬃciently small ﬁxed parameter of choice that
indicates when the interest rate may be considered converged to its reference value. The degree
of smoothing increases with the policy horizon in a concave fashion.
In particular, H = 0 will lead to (almost) no interest rate smoothing (%H = δ) while large
values of H will imply a high degree of interest rate smoothing since %H = δ1/(H+1) −→ 1
when H −→ ∞. The case H = 0 refers to the case when the policy maker only allows interest
rates to deviate from their reference in a single period at time τ.
However, the initial response becomes stronger with a short policy horizon than with a
relatively longer policy horizon. The value of the response coeﬃcient βε,H (≡ (1−%H)βε/(1−φ))
declines (in a geometric fashion) with the policy horizon or degree of interest rate smoothing.
In particular, (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ) ≈ βε/(1 − φ) when H = 0, while (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ) −→ 0
when H −→ ∞; since %H −→ 1. This suggests that if a very long policy horizon is chosen, the
interest rate needs to deviate only marginally from its reference value, but this deviation has
to persist for a long time.
A long horizon would help subdue the required initial response to a relatively persistent
shock. Especially, if persistence in a shock is matched by persistence in interest rates, i.e.
%H = φ, the initial response becomes equal to βε. In contrast, a short horizon may imply a
particularly large deviation from the neutral level of interest rate in the face of a persistent
shock. This may not even be feasible if the shock requires particularly low interest rates due
to the zero bound on interest rates.
Clearly, the parameters characterizing the interest rate rule depend on the policy horizon
(H), in a given model and a given i0. By varying H, one can vary the interest rate rule and
thus the complete interest rate path as well as the level of the loss L(.). It follows that once the
rule (eq.15) is implemented in the model, the optimal policy response to a shock can be found
by minimizing the loss function (eq.14) with respect to the policy horizon H. The optimal
value of H will then deﬁne the optimal value of βε, H∗, the optimal degree of smoothing %H∗,
12as well as the optimal level of loss.
We are particularly interested in analyzing the eﬀect of persistence φ on the loss L(.) and
consequently on the choice of policy horizon (H). It is therefore useful to express the loss
function (eq.14) as an explicit function of H and φ:
L(.) ≡ L(H,φ). (16)





That is, if we had knowledge of φ, we could calculate the optimal policy, H∗(φ). The optimal
policy horizon, H∗, will depend on the degree of concern for stability in the real economy (λ).
Thus, βε, H∗ and %H∗, will also depend on λ.
5 Monetary policy under Knightian parameter uncertainty
We now extend our analysis to include Knightian uncertainty in the persistence of shocks. We
will derive a robust monetary policy response to a supply shock with unknown persistence. For
simplicity, we also assume that one can infer the identity of the shock, its size and its stochastic
process, though its duration is unknown. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the error term (ε) in
the equation for domestic inﬂation in an empirical model can be characterized as an AR(1)
process:
εt = φεt−1 + υt, (18)
where φ is the degree of persistence that takes on an unknown value in the range of [0,1). υt
represents an unobservable IID-shock, but the supply shock εt can be observed.
The realized value of φ will generally aﬀect the level of L(H; φ) and thereby the policy,
ceteris paribus; cf. eq.(15). However, in order to evaluate the performance of a policy rep-
resented by H, its contribution to performance must be separated from that of the economic
model and the realized value of φ.
One option is to evaluate feasible policies relative to the optimal policies under envisioned
outcomes of the unknown φ.8 The diﬀerence in relative performance would imply the relative
8Another option could be to evaluate a policy relative to the optimal policy, conditional on one’s best-guess
13loss, dL(H; φ), by pursuing a policy that is diﬀerent from whatever turns out to be the loss-
minimizing policy. Thus, by controlling the relative loss dL(H; φ) rather than L(H; φ), one
may control the loss due to the policy choice rather than to the φ-value. It is assumed that
the policy choice does not inﬂuence the underlying process determining the φ-value.
The relative loss can be deﬁned as:
dL(H; φ) ≡
L(H; φ) − L(H∗; φ)
L(H∗; φ)
. (19)
Here, L(H; φ) denotes the level of loss by choosing H conditional on a speciﬁc φ-value, while
L(H∗; φ) expresses the loss under optimal policy given the speciﬁc φ-value. It follows that
dL(H; φ) > 0 for H 6= H∗ while dL(H; φ) = 0 when H = H∗, when the loss function is
continuous in H and there is a unique optimum.
For expositional purposes or for the purpose of mere ranking of policies, it is often useful
to employ the following deﬁnition of the relative loss:
dL(H; φ) ≡
L(H; φ) − L(H∗; φ)
L(H; φ)
. (20)
This deﬁnition of the relative loss function allows one to conﬁne the values of dL(H;φ) to the
0–1 range, which facilitates a graphical presentation of relative losses and their examination.
We proceed in three main steps to implement the approach for deriving robust monetary
policy response to the supply shock.
First, we derive values of the loss function (L(H;φ)) and relative losses dL(H,φ) for diﬀer-
ent monetary policy responses to a shock εt, conditional on every value of φ within the range
of [0,1). We deﬁne the loss function by assuming λ equal to, say, 0.5, and let values of φ diﬀer
from each other by 0.1, for simplicity. A monetary policy response to a shock can be associated
with a value of the policy horizon H. Accordingly, we derive values of the loss function for
a wide range of policy horizons, say 0–12 quarters, representing monetary policy response to
a shock with a speciﬁc φ. The optimal policy response (to a shock with a speciﬁc φ) can be
represented by the optimal policy horizon, H∗ in eq.(17), and the associated value of the loss
function as L(H∗,φ).
We derive relative losses by pursuing diﬀerent policies in response to a shock for each value
value. How to form expectations about a parameter’s value which is subject to Knightian uncertainty is not
obvious, however. This is especially the case when the range of variation in a parameter or the uncertainty
associated with it is unbounded. One possibility under Knightian uncertainty is, however, to form an expectation
by placing an equal probability on all possible or plausible outcomes.
14of φ (within its range). The relative loss dL(·) by pursuing some policy represented by policy
horizon H is deﬁned as in equation (20). The ranking of the policies would remain largely the
same if we had used the deﬁnition (19).
Second, we derive losses by pursuing some policy H in response to the shock, conditional
on diﬀerent values of φ. Accordingly, to obtain values of dL(H;φ) for a speciﬁc policy, we vary
φ within the range [0–1), while keeping H ﬁxed, and then repeat this procedure for a diﬀerent
H and so on.
And third, the information from the second step is used to ﬁnd how much robustness
diﬀerent policies (H-values) oﬀer at diﬀerent levels of acceptable losses, dLa. Robustness of
a policy is measured by the range of φ for which the policy will imply lower loss than some
acceptable loss, i.e. dL(H; φ) ≤ dLa. A policy H0 will have higher robustness than policy H00
if dL(H0; φ) ≤ dLa is true for a wider range of φ than dL(H00; φ) ≤ dLa. Appendix 1 presents
the info-gap model for uncertainty in the degree of persistence, upon which the robustness
function is based, more precisely.
6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Model and monetary policy if persistence was known
We implement the above three steps in an econometric macromodel for Norway. The model
used is a version of the model developed in B˚ ardsen et al (2003) that has been previously
documented and used in Akram et al (2006). The model is (log) linear and estimated on
quarterly aggregate data. It may be considered a backward-looking model in the sense that it
does not make the expectation formation processes explicit. It is econometrically well-speciﬁed,
however, with apparently invariant parameters with respect to changes in monetary policy over
the sample: 1972–2001.
In the model, aggregate demand is determined by the real exchange rate, real interest rate
and wealth eﬀects from house prices and equity prices. Inﬂation is determined by a pro-cyclical
markup on domestic production costs represented by unit labor costs and costs of imported
inputs in domestic currency.9
We expose the model to a (supply) shock that raises inﬂation initially by one percentage
9The model also includes equations for credit demand, unemployment, wages, house prices, domestic equity
prices and the nominal exchange rate. Monetary policy represented by a short run interest rate has direct eﬀects
on these asset prices, credit and aggregate demand in the short run, but is neutral in the long run; see Akram
et al (2006) for details.
15point, and thereafter allow for ten diﬀerent degrees of persistence: 0, 0.1, 0.2,...0.9. For a
supply shock the derived estimate of βε turns out to be 4; see Section 4 and Akram (2006)
for more details. Estimates of the response coeﬃcients βε,H can be obtained from its formula:
(1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ), for diﬀerent degrees of persistence in the shock and interest rates, φ and
%H, respectively. Values of %H for diﬀerent policy horizons are obtained from %H = δ1/(H+1),
where δ is set to 0.1. This implies that we would consider an interest rate approximately equal
to its reference value if it deviates not more than 1/10 of a percentage point from the reference
value. Alternative values of δ do not bring about substantially diﬀerent results.
The left frame of Figure 1 displays values of the response coeﬃcient βε,H for various degrees
of persistence, φ, vs. the policy horizon, H, in the range from 0–12 quarters. It is evident
that an increase in persistence raises the required interest rate response upwards for all policy
horizons. For example, if H = 0, an increase in the inﬂation rate by one percentage point due
to a transitory shock (φ = 0) would require an increase in interest rate by 4 pp relative to its
reference value. However, if the shock is persistent, the required increase would be 5 pp, 6.7
pp, and 10 pp, for degrees of persistence equal to 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6, respectively. When H = 0,
however, interest rates would be brought back almost immediately, as %H = δ = 0.1.
Figure 1 also illustrates that an increase in the policy horizon contributes to reduce the
required initial interest rate response βε,H (left frame), but raises the degree of interest rate
smoothing %H (right frame). For example, the required initial interest rate responses, βε,H,
when φ = 0.4 and φ = 0.6 declines from 6.7 and 10 to 1.4 and 2.1, respectively, if the policy
horizon is 10 quarters rather than zero. This must, however, be accompanied by an increase
in interest rate smoothing, %H, from 0.1 to 0.81 (right frame).
Figure 2 presents values of relative loss functions, dL(H; φ) in response to the supply shock
under diﬀerent horizon-speciﬁc interest rate rules. The ﬁgure shows values of dL(H; φ) under
thirteen diﬀerent policies, represented by policy horizons in the range of 0–12 quarters, for each
value of φ from 0–0.9 with step size 0.1. The values of loss functions L(H,φ) and dL(H; φ)
have been obtained by implementing interest rate rules, adapted to the diﬀerent degrees of
persistence in the supply shock, for diﬀerent policy horizons and simulating the model over
a period of six years: 1995q1–2000q4. Thereafter, the conditional variances of inﬂation and
output have been calculated using the obtained results from the simulations. Values of the loss
function L(H; φ), which is deﬁned by eq.(14), have been obtained by combining the variances
assuming λ = 0.5, while those of the relative loss function dL(H; φ) have been obtained by
employing the deﬁnition eq.(20).






























Figure 1: Left: Initial interest rate response, βε,H, to supply shocks with diﬀerent degrees of
persistence, φ. The initial interest rate response is implied by policy horizons in the range 0–12
quarters. Right: Interest rate smoothing, %H, associated with diﬀerent policy horizons.
It appears that the relative loss dL(H; φ) has a unique minimum value. Values of
dL(H; φ) = 0 indicate that the associated value of H would be the optimal policy (alter-
natively, the loss minimising policy) for the given degree of persistence φ, while values of
dL(H;φ) > 0 indicate that the associated policy (H) would be suboptimal. In the case of
φ = 0.3, it seems that dL(H; φ) = 0 for two diﬀerent but adjacent values of H. This can
be explained as an artefact of the model where a change in H by one quarter implies only a
negligible change in the loss function.
Figure 2 suggests that the optimal horizon H∗(φ), conditional on speciﬁc degrees of persis-
tence (φ-values), increases with the degree of persistence. A long horizon amounts to choosing
a higher degree of interest rate smoothing and lower initial response; see Figure 1. Thus, one
may say that persistence in a shock favors persistence in interest rates as well. There are a
few exceptions from this pattern which may be explained by the fact that an increase in the
degree of persistence, of say 0.1, is too small to imply a shift in the policy horizon by a whole
quarter. A model at a higher frequency, e.g. monthly, may have provided a more continuous
relationship between φ and H∗(φ).
The intuition for the positive relationship between the degree of persistence and optimal























Figure 2: Values of dL(H; φ), which is deﬁned by eq.20, on the vertical axis vs. the policy
horizon in number of quarters on the horizontal axis, for various degrees of persistence, φ.
horizon is that the bulk of the eﬀects of persistent shocks emerge farther into the future than
those of relatively transitory shocks. Thus, if a short horizon is chosen, it would require a much
stronger immediate response whose main eﬀects would emerge earlier than those of persistent
shocks. This would contribute to higher variances of inﬂation and output and hence higher
loss. In contrast, if a longer horizon is chosen, the stabilizing eﬀects of monetary policy would
emerge more synchronous in time with those of persistent shocks. Hence, monetary policy
would prove to be relatively more stabilizing. The optimal horizon minimizes the loss function
by synchronizing the eﬀects of a shock with those of monetary policy as much as possible.
Figure 2 displays largely a convex relationship between the loss function dL(H,φ) and the
degree of persistence, as assumed in Appendix 1, eq.(23). Accordingly, it becomes more and
more costly as the true persistence deviates from the assumed persistence, which justiﬁes some
optimal horizon H∗. Furthermore, the loss is asymmetrically distributed around the optimal
policies (H∗’s). It can be more costly to choose a shorter horizon than to choose a longer
horizon.
The asymmetric shape of the relative loss functions depends largely on the form of the
monetary policy rule, as the model can be considered linear. Speciﬁcally, the monetary policy
18rule embeds a concave relationship between the degree of interest rate smoothing and the
policy horizon; see Figure 1. Thus, an increase in the policy horizon from a low level has a
larger eﬀect on the interest rate rule and consequently on the loss function than an increase in
the policy horizon from a relatively high level.
A linear relationship between the degree of interest rate smoothing and the policy horizon
would have contributed to a symmetric distribution of the (relative) losses around their optimal
levels. The optimal horizons would be aﬀected if the linear relationship is implemented. How-
ever, the results presented and to follow do not change qualitatively. Hence, our conclusions
remain the same in general terms.10
6.2 Robust-satisﬁcing monetary policy
Figure 3 presents robustness curves of diﬀerent polices at diﬀerent levels of acceptable losses,
measured relative to the optimum levels. The vertical axis shows the fraction of the range
for φ values for which a speciﬁc policy represented by the policy horizon will deliver a lower
loss than the acceptable loss: dL(H; φ) ≤ dLa. Diﬀerent levels of acceptable losses (dLa) are
measured on the horizontal axis in percent of deviations from optimum levels. The fraction 1
corresponds to the full range: 0-0.9, which constitutes 10 possible values. Thus, values of e.g.
0.5 and 0.7 indicate robustness against 5 and 7 out of the 10 possible φ-values, respectively.
The values constituting the diﬀerent ranges can be ascertained from Figure 2. Accordingly,
the fractions 0.5 and 0.7 refer to the ranges 0-0.4 and 0-0.6, respectively, when dLa = 10%. In
the special case of fraction 0.1, the subrange of possible φ-values consists of a single φ value
within the range 0-0.9, and can be ascertained from Figure 2.
We observe a positive relationship between the levels of acceptable loss, dLa, and the degree
of robustness, b α(H,dLa). That is, there is a trade-oﬀ between robustness and desired closeness
to the optimal level under a given outcome of φ. Hence, robustness comes at a price in terms
of deviation from the performance under the optimal policy.
Figure 3 shows that some policies are generally more robust than others. They have a
higher robustness than others at all levels of acceptable loss. In particular, policies associated
with long policy horizons tend to be more robust than those with relatively shorter horizons.
Accordingly, a given level of robustness can be achieved by accepting lower deviations from
10We obtained a linear version of the rule eq.(15) by assuming %H = µH, where µ was set to some numerical
value, e.g. 0.08, such that %H < 1 for all values of H considered. Accordingly, βε,H ((≡ (1 − %H)βε/(1 − φ)))
also becomes a linear function of H; cf. Section 4. A presentation of the numerical results in the case of the
linear rule has been left out, but is available upon request.


















Figure 3: Robustness functions for monetary policies associated with diﬀerent policy horizons
(H). The robustness on the vertical axis indicates the share of parameter range under which a
given policy represented by the policy horizon will deliver a relative loss (dL(H;φ)) not greater
than that indicated on the horizontal axis.
the optimum level with long policy horizons than with short policy horizons.
For example, Figure 3 suggests that the policy horizon of 10 quarters is able to provide
robustness against 9 outcomes of φ values up to 0.8 if one sets the acceptable loss at 10%. In
comparison, a policy horizon of 3 quarters would require an acceptable loss at 70% to deliver
the same level of robustness. For acceptable loss at 10%, the policy horizon of 3 quarters would
deliver a loss up to 10% for just 5 out of 10 φ values in the range 0-0.4. Notably, if one sets
acceptable loss at 20%, the policy represented by 10 quarters will enable one to achieve full
robustness, denoted by 1. That is, this policy will never deliver a relative loss higher than
20% under any of the ten possible φ values in the range 0-0.9. In contrast, the policy horizon
of 3 quarters requires willingness to accept relative losses up to 80% in order to obtain full
robustness.
The policy horizon of 10 quarters would represent optimal policy if persistence turns out to
be 0.6, i.e. H ∗(φ = 0.6) = 10. With a policy horizon of H=10, the response to a supply shock
that initially raises inﬂation by 1 percentage point would be to raise the interest rate by about
2 percentage points relative to its reference value and thereafter bring it back gradually over
2010 quarters. This implies an interest rate smoothing equal to 0.81; see Figure 1. Interestingly,
this value is close to that reported in several empirical studies; see e.g. Sack and Wieland
(2000).


















Figure 4: Robustness-functions for monetary policies associated with diﬀerent policy horizons
(H). The ﬁgure illustrates the case of preference reversal when dLa = 15%.
Figure 4 demonstrates the case of preference reversals regarding robustness of policies. We
note that a policy horizon of 9 quarters dominates the policy with policy horizon of 12 quarters
at relatively low levels of acceptable losses, while the opposite is the case at relatively higher
levels of acceptable losses. More precisely, a policy horizon of 9 quarter is preferred over a
policy horizon of 12 quarters for dLa < 15, while the converse is the case for dLa > 15. The
ﬁgure also shows that the policy horizon of 10 quarters dominates the policy horizons of 12
and 9 for dLa < 20 and dLa < 30, respectively. For dLa = 20 and dLa = 30, the policy horizon
of 10 quarters provide the same level of robustness as the policy horizons of 12 and 9 quarters,
respectively. However, the policy horizon of 10 quarters would be preferred, as the possible
loss incurred would never exceed that implied by the alternative policies horizons, irrespective
of the realized φ-value.
To summarize, the above analysis suggests that relatively long policy horizons tend to
be associated with more robust policy than short policy horizons. This implies that a less
21aggressive but persistent monetary policy stance will deliver a more acceptable performance
up to a higher degree of shock persistence than an aggressive policy stance. This supports
gradualism in interest rate setting to a large extent.
In the case of the supply shock considered, monetary policy associated with a policy horizon
of 10 quarters dominates all other policies associated with shorter or longer horizons. This
deﬁnes the optimal policy if persistence is actually 0.6. This demonstrates that the robust
policy diﬀers from the optimal policy under the worst-case scenario, which may be considered
the case when the degree of persistence is 0.9, due to its relatively large eﬀect on the loss
function.
The robust policy would be suboptimal if the degree of persistence turns out to be diﬀerent
from 0.6; see Figure 2. This is clearly the case if the supply shocks turn out to be transitory
with no persistence or highly persistent. However, one can be conﬁdent that the loss, relative
to whatever turns out to be the optimal level, does not exceed 10% for φ ∈ [0,0.8) and 20%
for φ ∈ [0,0.9).
7 Concluding remarks
We have adapted the information-gap decision theory to derive robust monetary policy when
there is Knightian parameter uncertainty. This approach allows one to manage uncertainty
by choosing a policy that delivers an acceptable performance for a known range of parameter
outcomes. Robust-satisﬁcing policies maximize that range for tolerable levels of performance.
Furthermore, it is proved that no other policy has greater probability of success.
We have illustrated this approach by deriving a monetary policy response to a supply shock
whose degree of persistence is uncertain in a Knightian way. We have used an econometric
model for Norway to undertake the empirical analysis. For convenience, we have characterized
monetary policy by rules that can be fully speciﬁed by a single decision variable: the policy
horizon. The results suggest that relatively long policy horizons or interest rate rules with
a relatively high smoothing parameter tend to be more robust than those with short policy
horizons, or a low degree of smoothing.
Several cases in our empirical analysis demonstrate that robustness is achieved in exchange
for suboptimal performance. These costs are brought about by uncertainty — a gap in our
information set — namely, our ignorance regarding the true degree of persistence. The ap-
proach outlined in this paper suggests a way to manage this uncertainty by choosing a policy
22that limits the possible deterioration in performance to some acceptable level irrespective of
how persistent the shock turns out to be.
Of course, the robustness of our results needs to be examined by considering alternative
classes of interest rate rules and/or models. The approach outlined can be adapted easily to
such tasks and to deriving robust-satisﬁcing policy when facing other sources of uncertainty
including model and data uncertainty.
References
Adalid, R., G. Coenen, P. McAdam and S. Siviero, 2005, The performance and robustness
of interest-rate rules in models of the Euro area, ECB working paper 479/2005.
Adam, K., 2004, On the relation between robust and Bayesian decision making, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 28: 2105–2117.
Akram, Q. F., 2006, Designing monetary policy using empirical macromodels, Working
paper (forthcoming), Norges Bank.
Akram, Q. F., G. B˚ ardsen, Ø. Eitrheim, 2006, Monetary policy and asset prices: To
respond or not?, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 11: 279–292.
Ben-Haim, Y., 2005a, Value at risk with Info-gap uncertainty, Journal of Risk Finance, 6:
388–403.
Ben-Haim, Y., 2005b, Info-gap robust-satisﬁcing monetary policy: modelling and managing
Ignorance, working paper.
Ben-Haim, Y., 2006a, Info-Gap Decision Theory: Decisions Under Severe Uncertainty, 2nd
edition, Academic Press, London.
Ben-Haim, Y., 2006b, Info-gap forecasting and the advantage of sub-optimal models, work-
ing paper. http://www.technion.ac.il/yakov/lectur.htm
B˚ ardsen, G., E. S. Jansen and R. Nymoen, 2003, Econometric inﬂation targeting, Econo-
metrics Journal, 6: 429–460.
Carmel, Y. and Y. Ben-Haim, 2005, Info-gap robust-satisﬁcing model of foraging behavior:
Do foragers optimize or satisﬁce?, American Naturalist, 166: 633-641.
Faust, J. and D. W. Henderson 2004, Is inﬂation targeting best-practice monetary policy?
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 86, 4, 11743.
Engle, R. F., D. F. Hendry, J. F. Richard, 1983, Exogeneity, Econometrica, 51: 277–304.
Epstein, L. G. and J. Miao, 2003, A two-person dynamic equilibrium under ambiguity,
23Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27: 1253–1288.
Epstein, L. G. and T. Wang, 1994, Intertemporal asset pricing under Knightian uncertainty,
Econometrica, 62: 283–322.
Estrella, A and F. S. Mishkin, 1999, Rethinking the role of NAIRU in monetary policy,
in Taylor, John B. (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, A National Bureau of Economic Research
Conference Report, pp.203–262, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler, 1989, Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior, Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 18: 141—153.
Halpern, B. S., H. M. Regan, H. P. Possingham and M. A. McCarthy, 2006, Accounting
for uncertainty in marine reserve design, Ecology Letters, 9: 2–11.
Hansen, L. P., and T. J. Sargent, 2001, Acknowledging misspeciﬁcation in macroeconomic
theory, Review of Economic Dynamics, 4: 519–535.
Hansen, L. P., P. Maenhout, A. Rustichini, T. J. Sargent, and M. M. Siniscalchi, 2006,
Introduction to model uncertainty and robustness, Journal of Economic Theory, 128:1–3.
Leitemo, K. and U. S¨ oderstr¨ om, 2005, Robust monetary policy in a small open economy,
Discussion Paper No. 5071, CEPR.
Levin, A. and J. Williams, 2003a, Robust monetary policy with competing reference models,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 50: 945–975.
Levin, A., V. Wieland and J. C. Williams, 2003b, The performance of forecast-based mon-
etary policy rules under model uncertainty, American Economic Review, 93 (3): 622–645.
Moﬃtt, L. J., J. K. Stranlund and B. C. Field, 2005a, Inspections to avert terrorism: Ro-
bustness under severe uncertainty, Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,
vol. 2, article 3: http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss3/3.
Moﬃtt L. J., J. K. Stranlund, B. C. Field, and C. D. Osteen, 2005b, Robust inspection for
invasive species with a limited budget, forthcoming in The Economics of Plant Health, Alfons
Oude Lansink, ed., Springer.
Moilanen, A. and B.A. Wintle, 2006, Uncertainty analysis favours selection of spatially
aggregated reserve structures. Biological Conservation, 129: 427–434.
Onatski, A. and N. Williams, 2003, Modeling model uncertainty, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 1: 1087–1122.
Rustem, B., V. Wieland and S. Zakovic, 2005, Stochastic optimization and worst-case
analysis in monetary policy design, CFS Working Paper No. 2005/4.
Pierce, S.G., K. Worden and G. Manson, 2006, A novel information-gap technique to
24assess reliability of neural network-based damage detection, Journal of Sound and Vibration,
293: Issues 1–2, pp.96–111.
Sack, B. and V. Wieland, 2000, Interest-rate smoothing and optimal monetary policy: A
review of recent empirical evidence, Journal of Economics and Business, 52: pp. 205–228.
Taylor, J. B. (ed.), Monetary Policy Rules, A National Bureau of Economic Research
Conference Report, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Tetlow, R. and P. von zur Muehlen, 2001, Robust monetary policy with misspeciﬁed models:
does model uncertainty always call for attenuated policy?, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 25 (6-7): 911–949.
Vinot, P., S. Cogan and V. Cipolla, 2005, A robust model-based test planning procedure,
Journal of Sound and Vibration, 288: 571–585.
25Appendix 1: Info-gap model of uncertainty in persistence
Here, we formulate the info-gap model, Φ(α,H), for uncertainty in the persistence, φ, for which
the analyst has complete Knightian uncertainty: the probability distribution of φ is unknown.
One has no estimate, in any statistical sense, of the value of φ.11
Even though the true value of φ is not known, it is still useful to talk about values of φ that
would motivate any particular choice of policy horizon H. For instance, if we are considering a
speciﬁc value of H, one may ask: given our economic models, what should φ be in order to make
this a good choice of H? There is nothing un-Knightian (or un-info-gap) about this question.
We can answer this question without supposing anything about the probability distribution of
φ. The value of φ which, were it the true value, would justify a particular H, will be denoted
e φ(H) and is deﬁned implicitly in the relation:
H = H∗(φ), (21)
where H∗(φ) is the full-knowledge loss-minimizing policy if the persistence equals φ. The
solution of this relation, for φ, may not be unique, in which case we deﬁne e φ(H) as the lowest
such solution:
e φ(H) = min{φ : H = H∗(φ)}. (22)
We now posit a “weak convexity” of the loss function. We assume that, for ﬁxed H:
∂ [dL(H,φ)]
∂|φ − e φ(H)|
> 0. (23)
That is, for a ﬁxed H, the loss function dL(H,φ) rises increasingly above the full-knowledge
value, dL[H, e φ(H)] = 0, as φ deviates from e φ(H). Relation (23) does not assert that dL(H,φ)
is convex vs. φ, but only that it has a unique minimum vs. φ in [0, 1), for any given H. We
posit that this weak convexity holds for dL(H,φ). (Figure 2 illustrates that this is indeed the
case for the macromodel used in our example.)
The weak convexity property implies that, for any non-negative bound on the loss function,
the corresponding set of φ-values is a simple interval, which we deﬁne as:
D(x,H) = {φ ∈ [0, 1) : dL(H,φ) ≤ x}. (24)
11This example could be extended to consider info-gap uncertainty in the probability distribution of φ. Ex-
amples of info-gap analysis of uncertainty probability distributions are found in Ben-Haim (2005a, 2006a).
26For any level of loss x, the set of φ values for which the loss (with policy H) does not exceed
x is the set D(x,H). Because the loss function has the property of weak convexity, this set is
an interval whose length we denote by |D(x,H)|. Since dL(H,φ) = 0 at its unique minimum,
e φ(H), we note that D(0,H) = {e φ(H)}.
The weak convexity property implies that the sets D(x,H) are nested:
x < x0 implies D(x,H) ⊆ D(x0,H). (25)
This states that any persistence, φ, whose loss is no less than x, also has loss no less than x0,
when the same policy is used.
We use this concept to deﬁne an info-gap model for uncertainty in φ. For any contemplated
policy horizon H, the info-gap model is the following family of nested sets of persistence values:
Φ(α,H) = {φ : φ ∈ D(x,H), x ≥ 0, |D(x,H)| ≤ α}, α ≥ 0. (26)
At any level of uncertainty α, the set Φ(α,H) contains all persistence values φ which belong
to sets D(x,H) no larger than α, regardless of the loss value x. The level of uncertainty is
unknown so α can take any non-negative value. The info-gap model is a family of nested sets
and obeys the axioms of contraction and nesting discussed in Section 2 (Ben-Haim 2006a).
In light of eq.(25) we see that, for any α, there exists an x(α) such that:
Φ(α,H) = D(x(α),H). (27)
Combining eqs.(24) and (27) we see that the uncertainty set, evaluated at a level of uncer-
tainty equal to the robustness, is:
Φ[b α(H,dLa), H] = D(dLa,H). (28)
We emphasize that this info-gap model depends on a contemplated policy horizon H. The
sets Φ(α,H) are an expression of epistemic (rather than objective or ontological or aleatoric)
uncertainty: if we use policy H, then the info-gap model contains all persistence values for
which the loss will not exceed some speciﬁc value. We don’t know which φ value will occur or
the value of α, so there is no known worst case (other than unbounded persistence).
27Appendix 2: Proof of Theorem 1
Let P(φ) denote the unknown cumulative probability distribution for the persistence, with
density function p(φ). From the deﬁnition of D(x,H) in eq.(24) we see that the set of all
persistence values for which policy H is successful is D(dLa,H). Thus, formally, the probability
of success for policy H is:
Ps(H,dLa) = P[D(dLa,H)]. (29)
which is precisely eq.(12).
From the property of weak convexity we know that D(dLa,H) is a simple interval, which
we denote:
D(dLa,H) = [φ1(H), φ2(H)], (30)
where the end-point functions φi(H) are known.12
We now deﬁne the property of coherence between the info-gap model, Φ(α,H) in eq.(26),
and the probability distribution P(φ). For notational convenience we deﬁne p(φi) = p[φi(H)]
and φ0
i = dφi(H)/dH.
Deﬁnition 1 The info-gap model, Φ(α,H) in eq.(26), and the probability distribution P(φ),





1] > 0. (31)
We can understand the meaning of coherence with the help of eqs.(28) and (30). A change in
the policy horizon, H, causes the info-gap model to shift, through movement of the endpoints
φi(H) of D(dLa,H). Policy change also alters the corresponding probability densities, p(φi).
The info-gap model and the probability distribution are coherent, in the sense of eq.(31), if
shifts in p(φi) are not disproportionately diﬀerent from the shifts in φi.
Proof of theorem 1. From relation (28) and the deﬁnition of Φ(α,H) in eq.(26) we see that:
b α(H,dLa) = |D(dLa,H)|. (32)
From the property of weak convexity we know that D(dLa,H) is an interval whose length is
φ2(H) − φ1(H). Consequently, changes in robustness, b α(H,dLa), resulting from changes in
12Whether the interval in eq.(30) is open or closed is immaterial for our argument; we assume closedness for
notational simplicity.
28policy, H, arise from alteration of the endpoints of D(dLa,H). Speciﬁcally, from eq.(32):
∂b α(H,dLa)
∂H
> 0 if and only if φ0
2 − φ0
1 > 0. (33)
Expression (29) relates the probability of policy success, Ps(H,dLa), to the persistence
interval D(dLa,H). This relation shows how the probability of success varies with changes in









> 0 if and only if p(φ2)φ0
2 − p(φ1)φ0
1 > 0. (35)
So, from the assumed coherence of the info-gap model with the probability distribution,
and combining eqs.(33) and (35), we obtain eq.(13) which completes the proof.
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